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Case No. 20091046-CA
IN THE

UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
State of Utah,
Plaintiff/ Appellee,
vs.

James Christiansen Crabb,
Defendant/Appellant,

Brief of Appellee
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Defendant appeals from convictions for possession of a controlled substance,
a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp.
2005), and possession of drug paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, in violation of
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004). This Court has jurisdiction under Utah
Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(e) (West 2009).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
1. Should this Court review Defendant's three insufficiency claims where two
of the claims are unpreserved and where Defendant has not marshaled the evidence
relevant to any of them? If the Court reviews the claims, was the evidence sufficient
to support the jury's finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Defendant possessed
methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia?

Standard of Review. This Court "will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient
evidence only when the evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, is
sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have
entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he
was convicted." State v. Buck, 2009 UT App 2, f 9, 200 P.3d 674 (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted).
2. Where the jury instructions required the jury to find all elements of the
offenses beyond a reasonable doubt, did the trial court err when it declined to give
Defendant's proposed instruction that the jury could not find him guilty "unless the
proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the defendant is
guilty, but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion"?
Standard of Review. Whether the trial court erred when it denied a jury
instruction is a question of law, reviewed for correctness. See State v. Haiyer, 2006
UT App 178, If 9,136 P.3d 1261.
3. Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred for instructing the jury
that the urine sample had been lost and not tested. He also claims the trial court
plainly erred for not dismissing the case based on the State's failure to provide him
a urine sample. Should this Court review these claims where Defendant invited any
error? If so, did the trial court plainly err for instructing the jury about a fact
stipulated to by both parties? Did the trial court plainly err by not dismissing based
2

on the State's failure to provide a urine sample, where Defendant has not shown
that the sample was exculpatory and where, in fact, Defendant expressly asked the
State not to provide the sample unless the State could provide twice as much urine
as the sample contained?
Standard of Review. To establish plain error, a defendant must show "(i) [a]n
error exists; (ii) the error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the
error is harmful, i.e., absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of a more
favorable outcome for [the defendant]." State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201,1208-09 (Utah
1993). But where a defendant has invited error, review for plain error does not lie.
State v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155,159 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES
The following relevant constitutional statutes are included in Addendum A:
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (West Supp. 2005) (controlled substancesdefinitions);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (West Supp. 2005) (controlled substancesprohibited acts);
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5 (West 2004) (drug paraphernalia).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The State charged Defendant by second amended information with
possession of methamphetamine, a third degree felony, possession of drug
paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor. R322-23. A jury found Defendant guilty on
both counts. R394.
3

The trial court imposed a five-year maximum indeterminate prison term on
the methamphetamine possession conviction and a concurrent six-month jail term
on the drug paraphernalia conviction. R416-17. The court suspended the sentences
and placed Defendant on six months' probation. Id. As a condition of probation,
the court ordered that Defendant serve a 90-day jail term. Id.
Defendant timely appealed the judgment. R414-15.1
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
At about 10:30 a.m. on October 20, 2005, five officers from the Central Utah
Narcotics Task Force executed a search warrant on a small, "older type" camp
trailer in Elsinore, Utah. R434:96-97,99. The trailer was situated on property owned
by Morris Crabb, Defendant's father. R434:97,275. Defendant's witness described it
as "nothing but an office/' "a painter's booth." R434:257. Defendant painted cars in
a tarp-covered lean-to or makeshift garage attached to the trailer. R434:97,103,256.
The trailer was "not very big, and [the walls were] not very far apart." R434:107.

1

The appeal, filed after the announcement but before the entry of judgment,
was timely as to the judgment. See R399-401,416-18; see also Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2).
It was not timely, however, as to the denial of a later-filed motion for new trial. See
Utah R. App. P. 4(b)(2).

4

Detective Kerry Ekker, standing in the doorway of the trailer, could see Defendant
and all the other officers. Id.
Inside, on the south side of the trailer, the officers found Defendant in a bed.
R434:107-08,112. He was half-dressed and looked like he was sleeping in the bed.
R434:178. The officers took Defendant outside and then searched the trailer.
R434:108.
In "a little closet space" about an "arm's reach" from the bed, the officers
found a broken light bulb containing burnt residue. R434:109-10. In a cubby hole at
the end of a couch at the northeast corner of the trailer, they found an unbroken
light bulb. R434:112-113. The center metal piece had been bored out, forming a
tempered-glass pipe. R434:114-15. The unbroken bulb also contained residue.
R434:115.
Officer Kerry Ekker later scraped residue from the broken bulb and delivered
it to the State Crime Laboratory. R434:116-17. The residue tested positive for
methamphetamine. R434:224.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
1. The evidence sufficed to support Defendant's conviction. Defendant was
found alone in bed in his trailer. Within an "arm's reach" of the bed, officers found
a modified light bulb with burnt residue. The residue later tested positive for
methamphetamine. Another light bulb was found next to Defendant's couch. It too
5

contained burnt residue. This evidence established a sufficient nexus between
Defendant and the methamphetamine and paraphernalia to show that he had the
power and intent to exercise control over them and therefore to support a jury's
finding beyond a reasonable doubt that he possessed them and that he possessed
the paraphernalia for a prohibited purpose. The State was not required to show, in
addition, that the evidence precluded every reasonable alternative hypothesis of
guilt, as it is within the province of the jury to weigh competing theories of the case
and conclude which one they believe.
2. The trial court did not err when it rejected Defendant's proposed jury
instruction requiring the jury to eliminate all reasonable alternative hypotheses of
guilt. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held that when the jury is correctly
instructed on the requirement that it may convict a defendant only upon finding
him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no need to provide the jury with a
reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction. And the United States Supreme Court
has held that where the jury is properly instructed on the standards for reasonable
doubt, an instruction requiring the prosecution to exclude every reasonable
hypothesis other than guilt is confusing and incorrect.
3. Defendant claims that the trial court erred when it instructed the jury that
the urine sample was lost and when it did not dismiss the case for the State's alleged
failure to preserve and produce exculpatory evidence. First, Defendant invited the
6

very error he now claims on appeal, thus foreclosing review for plain error.
Moreover, Defendant has not shown that the trial court erred, let alone obviously
and prejudicially erred, when it gave the jurors the stipulated fact that the urine
sample had been lost, thus providing a neutral explanation for the lack of testing
results in the trial testimony. Moreover, he has not shown that the trial court erred,
let alone obviously erred, for not dismissing the case for the State's alleged
destruction or concealment of the urine sample. The State did not produce the
sample because Defendant requested a sample only if the State could provide 60 cc's
of urine. The State responded that it had only 30 cc's. Nothing suggests that
Defendant later requested a smaller sample. Moreover, even had the State failed to
produce a requested sample, Defendant suffered no violation of his due process
rights. Where evidence is only potentially exculpatory, failure to preserve that
evidence does not constitute a denial of due process unless the defendant can show
bad faith on the part of the police. Defendant has not suggested, much less shown,
bad faith. Moreover, nothing in the record suggests that any error should have been
obvious, and Defendant has not demonstrated harm. He has not shown that the
sample would have been exculpatory or that his testing of it would have made any
difference to the jury.

7

ARGUMENT
On appeal, Defendant claims that the evidence is insufficient to support his
possession convictions for multiple reasons: he claims the evidence is insufficient
(1) to show that he possessed methamphetamine and paraphernalia, (2) to show that
he possessed paraphernalia with the intent to use it for a prohibited purpose, and
(3) to establish a chain of custody demonstrating that the lab-tested residue was the
substance taken from Defendant's trailer (the chain of custody claim). He further
claims that the trial court erred when it rejected his jury instruction requiring the
jury to eliminate all reasonable alternative hypotheses of innocence. Finally, he
argues that the trial court plainly erred for instructing the jury that the urine sample
had been lost and for not dismissing the case upon learning that a sample survived
and had not been produced.
I.
THIS COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW DEFENDANTS
INSUFFICIENCY CLAIMS WHERE TWO OF HIS THREE
CLAIMS ARE UNPRESERVED AND WHERE HE HAS NOT
MARSHALED THE EVIDENCE SUPPORTING ANY OF THE
CHALLENGED FINDINGS; IN ANY CASE, THE EVIDENCE
SUFFICED
A, This Court should not review Defendant's unpreserved
insufficiency claims where he has articulated no justification
for review.
As a preliminary matter, this Court may decline to review Defendant's claims
for inadequate briefing. Under the appellate rules, an appellant is required to
8

"cit[e] to the record showing that the issue was preserved in the trial court." Utah
R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A). Defendant has not provided such a citation for any of his
claims, including his sufficiency claims, but has "dump[ed] the burden" of
research on this Court and on opposing counsel; therefore, the Court need not
review them. West Jordan City v. Goodman, 2006 UT 27, If 29, 135 P.3d 874
(internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Moreover, the State, in its review of the record, has found only one sufficiency
claim that was preserved below. After the State rested, defense counsel moved "to
dismiss, at least the charges as to possession," alleging that the State had not
"established the chain of evidence from the crime lab back to here." R434:239-40.
But Defendant did not claim that the evidence was insufficient to show constructive
possession of the items in his trailer or to show that he possessed the paraphernalia
with a prohibited intention.
This Court will review unpreserved claims only where an appellant argues
some justification for review. State v. Finder, 2005 UT 15, If 45,114 P.3d 551 (citing
State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226,1229 n.5 (Utah 1995)). Defendant argues no exception
to the preservation rule, Thus, this Court should decline to review Defendant's
unpreserved claims that the evidence did not suffice to show actual or constructive
possession of methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia or to show possession of
paraphernalia with a prohibited intent.
9

B. This Court should not review any of Defendant's insufficiency
claims where he has not marshaled the evidence supporting
the fact-dependent legal conclusions he challenges.
Rule 24 also requires an appellant, when challenging a factual finding or a
fact-dependent legal conclusion, to "first marshal all record evidence that supports"
the challenged finding or ruling. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9); Chen v. Stewart, 2004
UT 82, | 20,100 P.3d 1177 ("Even where the defendants purport to challenge only
the legal ruling, as here, if a determination of the correctness of a court's application
of a legal standard is extremely fact-sensitive, the defendants also have a duty to
marshal the evidence."). Proper marshaling requires an appellant to amass "every
scrap of evidence and draw all reasonable inferences that support the adverse
decision and then show why that evidence, even when viewed in the light most
favorable to the decision, is legally insufficient."

United Park City Mines Co. v.

Stichting Mayflower Mountain Fonds, 2006 UT 35, f 24,140 P.3d 1200; State v. ChavezEspinoza, 2008 UT App 191, H 7 & 20,186 P.3d 1023. The requirement is not met
"by simply providing an exhaustive review of all evidence presented at trial"
United Park City Mines, 2006 UT 35, Tf 26 (citation and internal marks omitted).
Rather, parties are required to "temporarily remove their own prejudices and fully
embrace the adversary's position; they must play the 'devil's advocate.' In so doing,
appellants must... not attempt to construe the evidence in a light favorable to their
case... [and must not] merely re-argue the factual case presented in the trial court."
10

Id. (citations and internal marks omitted). When an appellant fails to properly
"perform this critical task, [the appellant court] can rely on that failure to affirm the
lower court's findings of facts" and its fact-dependent legal rulings. Id. at 27; see
also State v. Clark, 2005 UT 75, f 17,124 P.3d 235 (same).
Defendant has not met the marshaling requirement. Defendant challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence to show possession of methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia, to show that the paraphernalia was possessed with a prohibited
intent, and to show that the residue tested was the residue taken from his trailer. Br.
Appellant at 18-35. But he has not amassed the evidence or drawn the inferences
supporting the findings the trial court necessarily made, i.e., findings that the
evidence did suffice, when it submitted the case to the jury. Nor has he explained
why that evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to those findings, was
insufficient.

*\

While Defendant provides a Statement of Facts, Br. Appellant at 9-17, he has
not marshaled the record evidence that supported submission of the case to the jury.
The Statement does not present all the evidence supporting the trial court's decision,
nor does it present the evidence in a light most favorable to the State. See id.
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C. The evidence sufficed to support the jury's finding Defendant
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
In any case, the evidence sufficed to show that Defendant possessed the
methamphetamine and paraphernalia found in his trailer, that he possessed the
paraphernalia with a prohibited intent, and that the residue tested was the residue
taken from the light bulb found in his trailer.
This Court "will reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence only when the
evidence, viewed in a light most favorable to the verdict, '"is sufficiently
inconclusive or inherently improbable that reasonable minds must have entertained
a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted/" Buck, 2009 UT App 2, f 9 (quoting State v. Lyman, 966 R2d 278, 281
(Utah App. 1998)) (in turn quoting State v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232,236 (Utah 1992)).
1. The evidence sufficed to support the jury's finding that
Defendant possessed methamphetamine and drug
paraphernalia and that he possessed the paraphernalia
with the intent that it be used to introduce drugs into the
human body.
The evidence sufficed to show that Defendant possessed both drugs and drug
paraphernalia. It also sufficed to show that he possessed the paraphernalia for one
or more of the prohibited purposes enumerated in the statute.
Applicable law. It is unlawful "for any person knowingly and intentionally
to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance, unless it
was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while
12

acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as otherwise authorized
by this chapter." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (West Supp. 2005). It is also
"unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia
to . .. inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l) (West 2004).
Possession of a controlled substance or drug paraphernalia may be proved by
showing that the defendant had either "actual possession" or "constructive
possession" of the contraband. See State v. Workman, 2005 UT 66, f 31,122 P.3d 639.
Actual possession occurs when the contraband is found on the defendant's person
or is otherwise under his or her direct control. See State v. Carter, 696 N.W.2d 31,38
(Iowa 2005) (holding that "[ajctual possession occurs when the controlled substance
is found on the defendant's person"); State v. Matthews, 484 P.2d 942, 943 (Wash.
App. 1971) (holding that "[a]ctual possession is proved when the drugs are found to
be in the actual, physical custody of the person charged with possession"). Because
the contraband in this case was not found on Defendant's person, the State was
required to prove that Defendant had constructive possession of the drugs and
paraphernalia found in the trailer. See id.
To prove constructive possession, the State must introduce evidence
establishing "'a sufficient nexus between the accused and the [contraband] to permit
an inference that the accused had both the power and the intent to exercise
13

dominion and control over the [contraband]/" Workman, 2005 UT 66, % 31 (quoting
State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985)). In other words, "[t]here must be some
action, some word, or some conduct that links the individual to the narcotics and
indicates that he had some stake in them, some power over them." Rivas v. United
States, 783 A.2d 125,130 (D.C. 2001). Simply stated, "[t]here must be something to
prove that the individual was not merely an incidental bystander." Id.
Whether a defendant had a sufficient nexus to infer constructive possession is
"a highly fact-sensitive determination," State v. Layman, 1999 UT 79,114,985 P.2d
911, which "depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case," Fox, 709 P.2d
at 319.

In making that determination, courts may consider such factors as

"ownership and/or occupancy of the . . . [place] where the drugs were found,
presence of defendant at the time drugs were found, defendant's proximity to the
drugs, previous drug use, incriminating statements or behavior, [and] presence of
drugs in a specific area where the defendant had control." Workman, 2005 UT 66,
If 32. However, this list of factors is not to be treated as "a checklist of things that
must be present if the law's requirements are to be met." Layman, 1999 UT 79, f 15.
The listed factors are not "universally pertinent" and the list is not "exhaustive." Id.
at 14-15; accord VJorkman, 2005 UT 66, % 32.
As explained in Layman, "[t]he final legal test is the most generally-worded
one," i.e., whether the facts and circumstances establish "a sufficient nexus between
14

the defendant and the drugs or paraphernalia to permit a factual inference that the
defendant had the power and the intent to exercise control over the drugs or
paraphernalia." Layman, 1999 UT 79, *|[ 15.
Moreover, "'[pjossession' or 'use' . . . includes individual, joint, or group
possession or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or user of
a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have individually
possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the
person jointly participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or
control of any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the
controlled substance is found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the
person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it." Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-2 (West Supp. 2005).
a. The evidence sufficed to support a finding that
Defendant possessed both drugs and drug
paraphernalia.
Here, the evidence sufficed to show that Defendant possessed both drugs and
drug paraphernalia.

Morris Crabb testified that the trailer and the attached

makeshift garage belonged to Defendant, his son. See R434:275. Looking at an
exhibit picturing the trailer and attached garage, Mr. Crabb stated: "This is my
son's work shop, he built it out on our property." Id. He stated that Defendant used
the attached makeshift garage for painting cars and doing mechanical work.
15

R434:276. Mr. Crabb had been out to the trailer, but "didn't go out there very
often." R434.-281.
Moreover, the officers executing the warrant found Defendant alone in the
trailer, half-dressed and in bed. R434:107-08,112,178. In a little closet space about
an "arm's reach" from the bed, they found the broken light bulb with its burnt
residue. R434:109-10. The bulb had been transformed into a pipe and contained
burned residue. R434:114-115. The evidence tested positive for methamphetamine.
R434:224. Next to the couch in the trailer, the officers found a bored-out light bulb
also containing residue. R434:112-14.
Testimony regarding these matters established a sufficient nexus between the
Defendant and the drugs and paraphernalia "to permit an inference that
[Defendant] had both the power and intent to exercise dominion and control" over
them. See Workman, 2005 UT 66, | 31 (quoting State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319 (Utah
1985)). This sufficed to show that Defendant possessed both bulbs.

While

Defendant did not have the light bulb in his hand when the officers entered, the
broken bulb was next to his bed and the other bulb was next to his couch. R434:10910. Thus, the testimony showed that Defendant owned and occupied the trailer
where the drugs and paraphernalia were found, he was present when they were
found, he was close to the items when they were found, and he had control of the
area where they were found. This evidence established a sufficient nexus between
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Defendant and the items to show that he had the power and intent to exercise
control over them. It thus sufficed to show that Defendant possessed both drugs
and drug paraphernalia.
b. The evidence also sufficed to support a finding that
Defendant possessed the paraphernalia with the intent
that it be used to "introduce a controlled substance into
the human body."
There is no law against possessing light bulbs or even broken light bulbs.
Thus, the evidence must be sufficient to support a finding that the light bulbs were
possessed with intent that they be used for a prohibited purpose, such as for
introducing drugs into the human body.
Here, the evidence showed that the light bulbs had been altered by boring out
their centers. R434:115-16. Thus, the light bulbs could not be used for their normal
purposes. The evidence also showed that they contained burned residue. R434:10915. Thus, they had apparently been used for burning something. Tests were
performed on the residue taken from one of the light bulbs. R434:222-24. The tests
identified the residue as methamphetamine. R434:224. Additionally, there was
testimony that the broken light bulb had been converted into a pipe. R434:114-15.
From this evidence, the jury could reasonably have inferred that Defendant
possessed the light bulbs with the intent that they be used to introduce drugs into
the human body.
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Defendant seems to argue that the verdict form had to include all of the
elements of the offense. He asserts that because the verdict form allowed the jury to
find him "guilty of 'possession of drug paraphernalia,'" but did not specify that the
possession be "'with intent to use[] drug paraphernalia' for any of twenty-two
specified 'pupose[s],'"the jury failed to find him guilty of one of the elements of the
crime." Br. Appellant at 36.
But verdict forms usually only list the offense, not the elements of the offense.
Jury instructions, on the other hand, contain the elements. Here, Instruction No. 31
told the jury that before they could convict Defendant of possession of drug
paraphernalia they "must find, from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of
the following elements of the crime" — (1) "That on or about October 20, 2005, at
Sevier County, State of Utah, the Defendant possessed with intent to use drug
paraphernalia," and (2) "That the purpose of possessing the drug paraphernalia was
to inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body." R388.
Jurors are presumed to follow the instructions given them. See State v.
Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 (Utah 1998) (holding that the Court will normally
presume that the jury will follow the trial court's instructions unless there is an
overwhelming probability that the jury will be unable to do so).
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Here, having been instructed that they had to find that Defendant possessed
the paraphernalia with the purpose to "inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce
a controlled substance into the human body/' the jurors could not have found
Defendant guilty on the drug paraphernalia charge without first having found that
he possessed it for one of the four enumerated purposes. Those four purposes are
are among the prohibited purposes specified by the drug paraphernalia statute. See
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5. Thus, the jury's verdict reflects its finding that
Defendant possessed the paraphernalia with the intent that it be used for a
statutorily-prohibited purpose.
c. Testimony that other persons may have had access to
the trailer did not foreclose the jury's finding that
Defendant possessed the drugs and paraphernalia.
Defendant argues that the State is required to "preclude every reasonable
hypothesis of innocence/' Br. of Appellant at 28. In making this claim, Defendant
cites to a plurality opinion in State v. Hill, 727 P.2d 221,222 (Utah 1986), which sets
forth this standard in opining that the evidence in that case was insufficient, a view
contrary to that of the majority in the case and not controlling precedent. Defendant
then speculates that the drugs and paraphernalia could have been left in the trailer
twenty years before the search. Br. Appellant at 27. He speculates that they could
have been left in the trailer by other persons visiting while Defendant worked in the
garage or while Defendant was not at home. Id. He speculates that because a
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fingerprint expert found prints on one of the light bulbs, but could not identify the
prints as being Defendant's, "the broken bulb was not Defendant's." Id. at 28 (italics
omitted) (citing R434:148).
But the State is not required to preclude every hypothesis or even every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. "The existence of one or more alternative
reasonable hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the jury from concluding that
[a] defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Buck, 2009 UT App 2, Tf 14
(quoting State v. Lyman, 966 P.2d 278,281 (Utah App. 1998)) (additional citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). "This is so because it is the exclusive province of
the jury to weigh the competing theories of the case, in light of the evidence
presented and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and to conclude which
one they believe." Id. "[I]t is perfectly appropriate for a jury to reject a reasonable
alternative hypothesis presented by the defense, and to convict the defendant." Id.
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted). This is because it is "within the
province of the jury to judge the credibility of the testimony, assign weight to the
evidence, and reject these alternate reasonable hypotheses." Id. (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). "Where the jury has done just that," this Court
"will reverse its verdict only if [it] determine[s] that the evidence and inferences did
not preclude the reasonable alternative hypothesis presented by the defense." Id.
"[P]ut another way, [this Court] will reverse a conviction if the evidence is so
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insubstantial or inconclusive that reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a
reasonable doubt as to a defendant's guilt." Id. (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
Similarly, reviewing the court of appeals' holding on a challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence in Layman, 1999 UT 79, | 2, the Utah Supreme Court
explained, "[W]e find the court of appeals' discussion of the reasonable alternative
hypothesis doctrine problematic and unnecessary." Cf. Holland v. United States, 348
U.S. 121,139-40 (1955) (stating that instructing on reasonable alternative hypothesis
is "confusing and incorrect") (discussed more extensively under Point II, below).
The Utah Supreme Court went on to find the evidence insufficient to support the
jury's guilty verdict, but not because the State had failed to eliminate some
reasonable alternative hypothesis of innocence. Rather, the Supreme Court applied
the ordinary standard: "An appellate court should overturn a conviction for
insufficient evidence when it is apparent that there is not sufficient competent
evidence as to each element of the crime charged for the fact-finder to find, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the defendant committed the crime. Layman, 1999 UT 79,
f 12.
Here, Defendant's father testified that Defendant owned the small trailer,
R434:275. Officers testified that he was found sleeping there. R434:107-12,178,286.
No testimony was given that anyone else occupied or ever slept in the trailer. See id.
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The officers testified that Defendant was present when the trailer was searched,
R434:107, and that contraband was within an "arm's reach" of his bed, R434:109-10.
Given that testimony, the evidence was not so insubstantial or inconclusive that
reasonable minds must have doubted that Defendant possessed it, i.e., that he had
both the power and the intent to exercise dominion and control over the drugs and
the paraphernalia. And this is so whether he individually possessed the drugs and
paraphernalia or "jointly participated with one or more persons in the use,
possession, or control of" them. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2. Thus, even assuming
that someone else had had used the drugs and paraphernalia in the trailer, whether
in Defendant's absence or presence, the facts were still sufficient to show that
Defendant possessed the drugs and paraphernalia when the officers searched the
trailer.
2. The evidence sufficed to support a finding that the residue
that tested positive for methamphetamine was the residue
found in Defendant's trailer.
Defendant also claims that the trial court erred when it denied his motion to
dismiss. See Br. Appellant at 36-37. He claims that the evidence was insufficient to
support his conviction for drug possession because the chain of evidence was
imperfect. See id.} see also R434:240. He asserts "there was a broken chain of
evidence because no one testified about how the baggie with residue came from the
laboratory to the evidence locker and how the evidence came from the evidence
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locker to the trial court/7 Br. Appellant at 37. While Defendant's claim is not
completely clear, he apparently is arguing that the residue should not have been
admitted at trial and should not be considered in assessing the sufficiency of the
evidence, because the chain of custody was allegedly broken when no one could
testify for certain what officer returned the residue from the crime laboratory to the
evidence locker.
Inadequate briefing. As a preliminary matter, this Court may decline to
address this issue because it is inadequately briefed. Defendant cites only one case
for his claim, State v. Madsen, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (Utah 1972), which affirmed the
admissibility of evidence where the evidence was shown, like the evidence in this
case, to be "in substantially the same condition as at the time of the crime/' But
Defendant ignores law developed in the intervening almost-40 years that expressly
holds that where the court finds the evidence to be in substantially the same
condition, defects in the chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility. See State v. Torres, 2003 UT App 114, ^ 8, 69 P.3d 314; State v. Eagle
Book, Inc., 583 R2d 73, 74 (Utah 1978); State v. Wynia, 754 P.2d 667, 671 (Utah App.
1988); State v. Bradshaw, 680 P.2d 1036,1040 (Utah 1984) (all discussed below). In so
doing, Defendant has inadequately briefed his claim, again leaving the burden of
research and analysis to this Court and to the State. See Goodman, 2006 UT 27, f 29.
For this reason, this Court may decline to review the claim. See id.
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Applicable law. The relevant inquiry for a trial court considering whether to
admit an exhibit is not whether the party offering the exhibit has established a
sufficient chain of custody. See Torres, 2003 UT App 114, | 8. Although testimony
about an exhibit's chain of custody may be relevant, the trial court's inquiry
regarding foundation focuses on whether the exhibit has been changed or altered,
not on whether its chain of custody is unbroken: '"[b]efore a physical object or
substance connected with the commission of a crime is admissible in evidence there
must be a showing that the proposed exhibit is in substantially the same condition
as at the time of [the] crime/" Id. (quoting Eagle Book, 583 P.2d at 74) (alteration in
original). "Tf after consideration of [the circumstances surrounding preservation,
custody, and the likelihood of tampering with the substance] the trial court is
satisfied that the article or substance has not been changed or altered, [the trial
court] may permit its introduction into evidence.'" Id. (quoting Eagle Book, 583 P.2d
at 74-75) (alteration in original). "The party proffering the evidence is not required
to eliminate every conceivable possibility that the evidence may have been altered."
Wynia, 754 P.2d at 671 (citing Bradshaw, 680 P.2d at 1040). Sealed packaging
containing the appropriate identifying marks "strongly indicates] that the evidence
[is] still in its original form." Id.
The chain of custody for an exhibit is a matter of more concern for the jury
than the trial court. See Torres, 2003 UT App 114, If 8, 10. After a trial court
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determines that the exhibit has not been changed or altered—and is therefore
admissible— "it is up to 'the jury to weigh the evidence based on its assessment of
the showing of chain of custody/" Id. at 8 (quoting Eagle Book, 583 P.2d at 75).
Consequently, defects in the chain of custody go to an exhibit's evidentiary weight,
not its admissibility: " [a]ny weak link in the chain of custody in the State's case goes
to the weight of the evidence 'once the trial court has exercised [its] discretion [and]
conclude[d] that... the proffered evidence has not been changed in any important
respect.'" Id. (quoting Bradshaw, 680 P.2d at 1039); see also United States v. Cardenas,
864 F.2d 1528 (10th Cir. 1989) ("The well-established rule in this circuit is that
deficiencies in the chain of custody go to the weight of the evidence, not its
admissibility; once admitted, the jury evaluates the defects and, based on its
evaluation, may accept or disregard the evidence.").
When considering whether the State has established that an exhibit has not
been altered, a trial court must presume that law enforcement officers handle
exhibits with regularity: "[o]nce the evidence is in the hands of the state, it is
generally presumed that the exhibits were handled with regularity." Wynia, 754
P.2d at 671 (citing Eagle Book, 583 P.2d at 75). A defendant can rebut this
presumption only by making "an affirmative showing of bad faith or actual
tampering." Id. (citing Eagle Book, 583 P.2d at 75)', see also Cardenas, 864 F.2d at
1532-33 ("'Absent some showing by the defendant that the [evidence has] been
25

tampered with, it will not be presumed that the investigators who had custody of
[it] would do so/") (quoting United States v. Wood, 695 F.2d 459,462 (10th Cir. 1982))
(alterations in original).
Background. At trial, Detective Kerry Ekker testified that he saw the broken
light bulb in its original location in the trailer before it was gathered. R434:109. He
testified that he picked it up, placed it in an envelope, sealed it with evidence tape to
prevent tampering, and initialed it. R434:109-110. He also testified that he opened
the envelope to remove a sample of the residue from the light bulb to send to the
lab, replaced the bulb, and then re-taped and re-initialed the envelope. See R434:110.
He testified that the evidence custodian witnessed his scraping the residue from the
broken bulb. Id. He testified that he took the scraped residue, placed it in a new
ziplock baggie, put the baggie inside a manila envelope, filled out the envelope,
numbered it as item 1:A, and delivered it to the lab. R434:118-19. He identified the
item at trial and testified that it was "in substantially the same condition" as when
he "took the sample/' Id. The court admitted the item as Exhibit 5. R434:121. The
detective testified that "from the time he collected it to the time he dropped it off,"
he was the only person who had possession of the residue sample. R434:123.
Terry Lamoreaux, a forensic scientist for the Department of Public Safety,
testified that he recognized the sample based on the laboratory bar code label and
his intials that he had placed on the evidence bag. R434:219. He testified that he
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analyzed the evidence and returned it to the evidence room. R434:221. He testified
that he tested the residue twice and confirmed that it was methamphetamine.
R434:222-23. He then resealed it, dated it, initialed it, put it back into the evidence
bag, and checked it back into the evidence room. R434:23. He then wrote a report of
his findings. R434:223.
Detective Ekker testified that the item was later picked up at the crime lab.
R434:122. He did not know whether he or one of the other officers picked it up. Id.
Analysis. Defendant now claims that the evidence chain was broken because
the State did not identify and call the officer who picked up the residue from the
crime laboratory. Defendant claims that, absent this testimony, the verdict should
be reversed. Br. Appellant at 37.
On the contrary, the testimony established that when the residue was
introduced at trial, it was "'in substantially the same condition as at the time of [the]
crime.'" Torres, 2003 UT App 114, f 8 (quoting Eagle Book, 583 P.2d at 74). While
Detective Ekker could not remember whether he had personally picked up the
residue from the lab or whether it had been picked up by another officer, his
testimony was that it had been in the care of law enforcement. Thus, it "will not be
presumed that the investigators who had custody of [it]" would have tampered
with it. See Cardenas, 864 F.2d at 1532-33. And Detective Ekker's testimony, together
with the testimony of Terry Lamoreaux, the forensic scientist, demonstrated that the
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residue had been kept in sealed packaging containing the appropriate identifying
marks, thus "strongly indicating that the evidence was still in its original form/7 See
Wynia, 754 P.2d at 671. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting it.
Nor did the trial court err in admitting the results of the crime lab's testing.
The chain of custody was not in any way broken between the time the light bulb
was found and the residue collected and the time when the crime lab scientist
identified it as methamphetamine. Thus, the evidence sufficed to support a finding
that the tested substance was the residue found on the broken light bulb in
Defendant's trailer and that the residue found was methamphetamine.
Whether Detective Ekker or one of the other officers picked up the residue
after the testing was completed is not relevant to the critical issue here—whether the
residue tested was the residue that came from the broken light bulb. Indeed, had
the lab simply thrown the residue away or had it used up all the residue in the
testing process, the relevant chain of custody— the chain between the detective's
finding the residue in the light bulb in the trailer and the forensic scientist's
determining that it was methamphetamine —would still have remained unbroken.
Defendant has not established that the evidence was altered between the time
of the crime and his trial. More specifically, he has not established that it was
altered between the time Detective Ekker gathered it at the crime scene and the time
when scientist Terry Lamoreaux tested it and determined that it was
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methamphetamine. While the jury was entitled to consider any weakness in the
chain of custody in weighing the evidence, the evidence was admissible.
Moreover, under the circumstances, Defendant cannot show harm.

Even

assuming there was some break in the chain of custody upon return of the residue
to police, that chain between gathering the evidence and testing it was unbroken,
showing that the substance taken from Defendant's trailer was methamphetamine.
The alleged break in the chain occurred after the residue was tested and found to be
methamphetamine. Thus the alleged break did not affect the laboratory scientist's
testing and results and therefore could not have harmed Defendant.
II.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR WHEN IT REJECTED
DEFENDANTS PROPOSED JURY INSTRUCTION REQUIRING
THE JURY TO ELIMINATE ALL REASONABLE ALTERNATIVE
HYPOTHESES OF GUILT
Defendant claims that "[t]he trial court erred in rejecting [his] proposed jury
instruction that is consistent with case law regarding the State's need to preclude all
reasonable possibilities or alternate hypotheses of innocence in circumstantial
evidence cases in order for a defendant to be found guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt/7 Br. Appellant at 39 (boldface and uppercase omitted) (citing State v. Hill,
727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion)).
Background, Defendant proposed a jury instruction that included the
following paragraph:
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You are not permitted to find the defendant guilty of the charges
against him based totally on circumstantial evidence unless the proved
circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that the
defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any
other rational conclusion.
R372; see also R434:297-301. The trial court rejected that instruction. See R434:301.
The court did, however, give several instructions informing the jurors that they
could not find Defendant guilty unless they were "satisfied that each element [of the
offense] had been proven beyond a reasonable doubt/' See R384 (instruction on
possession of a controlled substance); R388 (instruction on possession of drug
paraphernalia); R391 ("The law presumes that the defendant is not guilty of the
crime(s) charged. This presumption persists unless the prosecution's evidence
convinces you beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty/').
The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's reasonable alternative
hypothesis instruction, as the proposed instruction did not accurately reflect the law
and where, alternatively, the instructions actually given sufficed to convey to the
jury that they could only find Defendant guilty if the credible evidence was
sufficient to show guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
As explained under Point IA3, above, the State is not required to preclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. "The existence of one or more alternative
reasonable hypotheses does not necessarily prevent the jury from concluding that
[a] defendant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." State v. Buck, 2009 UT App 2,
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If 14,200 P.3d 674 (quoting Lyman, 966 P.2d at 281) (additional citation and internal
quotation marks omitted). "This is so because it is the exclusive province of the jury
to weigh the competing theories of the case, in light of the evidence presented and
the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, and to conclude which one they
believe/7 Id. Thus, the jury can find a defendant guilty even where evidence has
been produced that provides a reasonable explanation consistent with innocence, if
the jury does not believe that evidence to be true.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly stated that when the jury
is correctly instructed on the requirement that it may convict a defendant only upon
finding him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, there is no need to provide the jury
with a reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction. See State v. Hansen, 710 P.2d
182,183 (Utah 1985) (addressing "reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction" and
stating that "we have clearly ruled that no such instruction need be given where the
jury is instructed that the State must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt"); State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211,1213 (Utah 1980) (the prosecution's burden of
proof "is that of beyond a reasonable doubt"; court must instruct the jury as to that
burden; court need not give reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction); cf. State
v. Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 n.l (Utah 1992) ("With regard to the 'no reasonable
alternative hypothesis' theory upon which defendant proceeds, we note that this
court has previously indicated that this is only one way of stating the prosecution's
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burden of proof, which requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt/'); State v. Slwffer,
725 P.2d 1301,1312 (Utah 1986) (affirming its "rule that [a reasonable alternative
hypothesis] instruction is unnecessary where the jury is instructed that the State
must prove a defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt") (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted); State v. Schad, 470 P.2d 246,247 (Utah 1970) (If "from all
of the facts and circumstances shown," the jurors "are convinced beyond a
reasonable doubt of the defendant's guilt, it necessarily follows that they regarded
the evidence as excluding every other reasonable hypothesis/').
Both the United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court have
explained that the reasonable alternative hypothesis doctrine, which is usually
invoked in cases based on circumstantial evidence, is confusing and problematic. In
Holland, the petitioners "assail[ed] the refusal of the trial judge to instruct that where
the Government's evidence is circumstantial it must be such as to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis other than that of guilt." 348 U.S. at 139. Noting that there
was "some support for this type of instruction in the lower court decisions," the
United States Supreme Court rejected the need for and use of such an instruction.
Id. (citations omitted). The court stated: "[T]he better rule is that where the jury is
properly instructed on the standards for reasonable doubt, such an instruction on
circumstantial evidence is confusing and incorrect." Id. at 139-40 (citations omitted).
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The court explained that it is the jury's responsibility to weigh the evidence and the
probabilities:
Circumstantial evidence in this respect is intrinsically no different from
testimonial evidence. Admittedly, circumstantial evidence may in
some cases point to a wholly incorrect result. Yet this is equally true of
testimonial evidence. In both instances, a jury is asked to weigh the
chances that the evidence correctly points to guilt against the
possibility of inaccuracy or ambiguous inference. In both, the jury
must use its experience with people and events in weighing
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can require no more.
M a t 40.
Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has explained that use of the reasonable
alternative hypothesis doctrine causes confusion. In Layman, that Court held that
the court of appeals' application of the reasonable alternative hypothesis doctrine
was "problematic and unnecessary" and clarified that the case "should have been
decided by applying an ordinary sufficiency of the evidence test." See 1999 UT 79,
11 2,10.
Defendant was entitled to instructions requiring the jury to find the elements
of the offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. See id. The instructions did that. See
R384, 388, 391. The trial court did not err in denying Defendant's problematic and
unnecessary reasonable alternative hypothesis instruction.
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III.
BECAUSE DEFENDANT INVITED ANY ERROR BELOW, THIS
COURT SHOULD NOT REVIEW HIS CLAIMS THAT THE
TRIAL COURT PLAINLY ERRED FOR INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THAT THE URINE SAMPLE WAS LOST OR FOR NOT
DISMISSING THE CASE
Defendant claims that the trial court plainly erred for telling "the jury that
[the urine sample] was lost and never sent to [the crime lab in] Fillmore/' Br.
Appellant at 38. He also claims that the trial court plainly erred for not dismissing
this case because the State failed to produce a urine sample at or before trial. Id. at
37-38. He asserts that the State's not producing a urine sample at trial was
"tantamount to the destruction of evidence in violation of Defendant's due process
rights/' Id. at 38. In support for his claim, Defendant cites a single federal case,
California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479 (1984).3
Background, Following his arrest, Defendant produced a urine sample.
R434:151. The State took the sample into custody. R434:151-53. Defense counsel,
Marcus Taylor, requested that the State split the sample and provide the defense a
3

Because Defendant has made no separate claim under the Utah Constitution,
the State does not address any state constitutional claim. See State v. Harris, 2004 UT
103,123,104 P.3d 1250 (quoting State v. Lafferty, 749 P.2d 1239,1248 n.5 (Utah 1988))
("As a general rule, [this Court] will not engage in [a] state constitutional analysis
unless an argument for different analyses under the state and federal constitution is
briefed.").
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split portion, but only if the split portion would constitute 60 or more cubic
centimeters (cc's). R78-79.4 Counsel stated that he intended to do both drug and
DNA testing and that the DNA testing required 60cc's. Id. He stated that "[i]f the
quantity of the urine sample is insufficient to meet this request, then the defendant
does not want the sample unthawed and split until he can make inquiries with other
laboratories." Id. The State later notified counsel that the urine sample was only 30
cc's. R126.
At trial, defense counsel, James Slavens, cross-examining Detective Kerry
Ekker, asked whether the sample had been lost. R434:151-52. The detective said
that it had not been lost, but remained frozen in the freezer in Fillmore. R434:152.
Mr. Slavens later stated that both he and his predecessor had made requests
for the urine sample and had been told that the sample was lost. R434;165, 241-42.
The prosecutor, then Mr. Jewkes, did not know whether the sample had been lost,
R434:246, but thought it had been lost and was unconcerned because the State had
not based any charges on Defendant's consumption of methamphetamine, R434:24142.
4

At least four different attorneys served as defense counsel below: Richard J.
Culbertson, R9, Marcus Taylor, R70, James K. Slavens, R194, and Douglas L. Neeley,
R403.
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Defense counsel stated that the lost sample was relevant because it showed
the State's "careless nature of taking care of evidence" and was thus relevant to
whether the residue in the broken light bulb "got sent to the crime laboratory in a
pristine manner." R434:242. He did not claim that the case should be dismissed
because the State had failed to produce exculpatory evidence. See id.
During a discussion after the State rested at trial, the trial court, concerned
because the prosecutor did not know whether the sample had been lost, discussed
the matter with both counsel. R434:249-53. The prosecutor said that he would be
willing to stipulate that a urine sample had been taken and was lost, but asked that
"there be no comment on whether it was positive or negative." R434:249-50. The
court asked defense counsel if that would be "all right." R434:250. Defense counsel
stated, "Absolutely

[T]he alternative would be for me to file a motion to dismiss

because they did not provide

" Id. The court then stated that the jury would be

given the stipulated fact that a urine sample was taken on the day of the arrest and
had been lost. Id.
Based on the parties' stipulation, the trial court gave the jury the stipulated
fact: "I mentioned earlier that there might be things that are stipulated. There is
one in this case. The stipulated fact is that a urine sample was taken on the date of
the arrest from the defendant. That urine sample has been lost." R434:253.
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After the defense rested, the trial court discussed with the parties questions
submitted by the jurors. One question read: "The Urine sample 'stipulated as lost/
was it analyzed before it was lost? If so what were the results? i.e., Positive or
Negative for Meth?" R370; R434:305.
The trial court asked whether "we'll simply state it was lost." R434:293. The
prosecutor agreed to that, but suggested the court could also add that "it was never
sent to the crime lab." Id. Defense counsel stated that he had no objection to doing
that. R434:294.
A. This Court should not review Defendant's plain error claims,
because Defendant invited any error.
To establish plain error, a defendant must show "(i) [a]n error exists; (ii) the
error should have been obvious to the trial court; and (iii) the error is harmful, i.e.,
absent the error there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [the
defendant]." Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09 (Utah 1993). "But under the doctrine of
invited error, [the appellate courts] have declined to engage in even plain error
review when 'counsel, either by statement or act, affirmatively represented to the
[trial] court that he or she had no objection to the [proceedings]/" State v. Winfield,
2006 UT 4, % 14,128 P.3d 1171 (quoting State v. Hamilton, 2003 UT 22, f 54, 70 P.3d
111).
Here, defense counsel affirmatively represented to the trial court that he
would welcome the court's providing a jury with a stipulation that the urine sample
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had been taken, but was lost. After the prosecutor said that he would be willing to
stipulate to that fact, R434:249-50, the court asked defense counsel if that would be
"all right." R434:250. Defense counsel stated, "Absolutely

[T]he alternative

would be for me to file a motion to dismiss because they did not provide . . . . " Id.
Moreover, when a juror later asked whether the sample had been tested and what
the results were, defense counsel affirmatively represented that he had no objection
to instructing the jurors that the sample was lost and never sent to the crime lab.
R434:294.
Counsel's responses constituted affirmative representations that the
stipulated explanations would be appropriate and that they would be an adequate
alternative to his filing a motion to dismiss. See R434:250. Defendant now claims
that the trial court plainly erred for telling the jury that the sample was lost and not
sent to Fillmore, Br. Appellant at 38, and for not dismissing this case because the
State failed to produce a urine sample at or before trial, id. at 37-38. Because
Defendant invited any error below, this Court should not review his claims for plain
error. See Winfield, 2006 UT 4,114.
B. Defendant has not adequately briefed his claims.
Moreover, Defendant has not adequately briefed these claims. "It is well
established that a reviewing court will not address arguments that are not
adequately briefed." State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299, 304 (Utah 1998). Under rule
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24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the appellant's argument "shall contain
the contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented."
"Implicitly, rule 24(a)(9) requires not just bald citation to authority but development
of that authority and reasoned analysis based on that authority." Tliomas, 961 P.2d
at 305.
Here, Defendant has not adequately explained what error occurred.
Defendant has cited to one case, Trombetta, 467 U.S. at 479, but has not explained
what standards it sets forth or how the trial court violated those standards in this
case. Moreover, Defendant has not attempted to show why the error should have
been obvious to the trial court or why, absent the error, there would have been a
reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome. Thus, Defendant has not
adequately briefed his claim, and this Court should not address it.
C. In any event, the trial court did not plainly err for instructing
the jury that the urine sample was lost and had not been
tested.
As explained, to establish plain error, Defendant must show that an error
exists, that it should have been obvious to the trial court, and that the error was
harmful, i.e., that absent the error there is a reasonable probability of an outcome
more favorable to Defendant. Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09.
The trial court did not err in instructing the jury that the urine sample was
lost and had not been tested. In so doing, the trial court provided the jury with a
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neutral explanation about why no testing had been done. Defendant has not
explained why the trial court erred in giving such an explanation to the jury,
particularly where both parties stipulated to that fact.
Moreover, he has not demonstrated that the trial court obviously erred.
Defendant has cited no settled appellate authority for his claim that the trial court
cannot provide a brief explanation, agreed to by both parties, to fill in an apparent
evidentiary gap. See State v. Ross, 951 P.2d 236, 239 (Utah App. 1997) (error not
obvious when "there is no settled appellate law to guide the trial court"). Moreover,
any error could not likely have been obvious, where both parties agreed to the
procedure.
Finally, Defendant has not demonstrated that the procedure harmed him.
The explanation was neutral. The record strongly suggests that the sample had not
been tested. See R434:151-53, 242-43. Therefore, nothing suggests that there were
any results showing whether Defendant was or was not using drugs at the time of
the search. And, in any case, the facts and circumstances showing that Defendant
possessed methamphetamine and contraband did not depend on his also using
them at the time he was found in possession. In other words, absent the stipulated
fact, there is no reasonable probability of an outcome more favorable to Defendant.
See Dunn, 850 P.2d at 1208-09.
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D. Further, the trial court did not plainly err for not sua sponte
dismissing the case, where the State adequately responded to
Defendant's conditional request for the urine sample and
where the sample was only potentially exculpatory.
Defendant apparently claims that "the State's failure to produce [the urine
sample] at trial was a spoliation of evidence," that the failure to produce violated his
due process rights, and that the trial court should therefore have "dismiss[ed] the
case due to the State destroying [or withholding] potentially exculpatory evidence."
Br. Appellant at 37-38 (boldface omitted).
Background, Defense counsel, Mr. Slavens, claimed at trial that both he and
his predecessor had made requests for the urine sample and had been told that the
sample was lost. R434:164,241-42. He asserted that both requests "should be in the
file." R434:242. On appeal, Defendant claims that trial counsel had made "multiple
requests" for the sample but had been told the sample was lost. See Br. Appellant at
38. While he cites to defense counsel's assertions at trial that this was what had
happened, Defendant does not cite to any motion or response in the pleadings. See
id.
In its review of the record, the State found that prior counsel, Marcus Taylor,
had requested a urine sample, asked that the sample taken by the State be split and
a portion provided to him, but only on condition that the sample was large enough
to provide him with 60 cc's or more after the split. See R78-79. He explicitly stated
that if he could not be given 60 cc's, he did "not want the sample unthawed and
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split until he [could] make inquiries with other laboratories/7 R79. The prosecutor
in the case, then Dale Eyre, responded, informing Mr. Taylor that the sample was
only30cc's. R126-27.
The State was unable to locate any further request from Mr. Taylor or his
successors in the record. At the time of trial, Casey Jewkes had apparently taken
over prosecution of the case from Mr. Eyre. When asked about the urine sample at
trial, he explained that he did not personally know what had happened to the
sample. R434:246. Detective Ekkers, however, testified that the sample had not
been lost, but had been frozen and transferred to Fillmore and was still there.
R434:151-52.
The record indicates that the State fully complied with Defendant's requests
regarding the urine sample. While defense counsel at trial, Mr. Slavens, suggested
that he had asked for the sample, the State has found nothing in the record showing
that he made such a request. The record indicates only that Mr. Slavens made a
general discovery request, R195-97, and that Mr. Eyre responded, R200-01. Neither
the request nor the response directly addressed the urine sample. See R195-97,20001. The request asked for "[a]ny and all exculpatory information of any type or any
evidence which tends to negate guilt" in the possession of the prosecutor, his staff,
any police officer, or any other person who participated in the investigation of this
case/'

R197. The prosecutor's response stated: "None, other than possible
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inferences from circumstances surrounding the investigation as indicated in the
police report/' R201. As nothing suggests that the urine sample was exculpatory or
tended to negate Defendant's guilt, Defendant has not shown that Mr. Slavens'
general request should have alerted the prosecutor that counsel now had changed
his mind and wanted a urine sample even though it would necessarily be less than
60 cc's.
Defendant claims that "the State's actions toward [the urine sample] were
tantamount to the destruction of the evidence in violation of Defendant's Due
Process rights." Br. Appellant at 38. The State's actions were not tantamount to
destruction of evidence. The State destroyed nothing and concealed nothing.
Moreover, even had the State destroyed the urine sample, it would not have
violated Defendant's rights. The urine sample apparently was not tested. See
R434:151. And the State had no duty to test the urine sample. See Arizona v.
Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51,59 (1988) (police have no constitutional duty to perform any
particular test). At most, the sample contained evidence potentially useful to
Defendant. But failing to produce potentially useful evidence does not, by itself,
violate the Due Process Clause. "[Ujnless a criminal defendant can show bad faith
on the part of the police, failure to preserve potentially useful evidence does not
constitute a denial of due process." Youngblood, 488 U.S. at 58. Defendant has not
suggested, much less shown, that police intentionally concealed or destroyed any
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evidence. Thus, Defendant has not shown that not providing the sample constituted
a denial of due process.
Moreover, Defendant has not shown that the State failed to respond to his
request for the urine sample. Defendant made a conditional request— a request he
explicitly asked be fulfilled only if the State could provide him at least 60 cc's of
urine. See R78-79. But the State had gathered only 30 cc's. R126-27. Defendant
explicitly told the State that he did not want the State to thaw and split the sample
until he could "make inquiries with other labs/' R79. Nothing in the record
suggests that Defendant later informed the prosecutor that he wanted a sample,
even if it had to be smaller than the sample he originally requested.
Under these circumstances, the trial court did not err, let alone plainly err, for
not dismissing the case based on the State's not producing the sample. Moreover,
nothing suggests that any error should have been obvious on the basis of this
record. Finally, Defendant has not demonstrated harm. He has not demonstrated
that the sample would have been exculpatory or would have made any difference at
all to the jury.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm.
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Addenda

Addendum A

§ 58-37-2. Definitions., U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-2

U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-2
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos)
§ 58-37-2. Definitions,

(1) As used in this chapter:
(a) "Administer" means the direct application of a controlled substance, whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any
other means, to the body of a patient or research subject by:
(i) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent; or
(ii) the patient or research subject at the direction and in the presence of the practitioner.
(b) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on behalf of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor, or
practitioner but does not include a motor carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of any of them.
(c) "Consumption" means ingesting or having any measurable amount of a controlled substance in a person's body, but this
Subsection (l)(c) does not include the metabolite of a controlled substance.
(d) "Continuing criminal enterprise" means any individual, sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, business trust,
association, or other legal entity, and any union or groups of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity, and
includes illicit as well as licit entities created or maintained for the purpose of engaging in conduct which constitutes the
commission of episodes of activity made unlawful by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, which episodes are not
isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, results, participants, victims, methods of commission, or otherwise are
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the episodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and
be related either to each other or to the enterprise.
(e) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the placement of a drug, substance, or immediate precursor under Section 5837-3.
(f)(i) "Controlled substance" means a drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of Section 58-37-4, and also
includes a drug or substance included in Schedules I, II, III, IV, or V of the federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L.
91-513 [FN1], or any controlled substance analog,
(ii) "Controlled substance" does not include:
(A) distilled spirits, wine, or malt beverages, as those terms are defined or used in Title 32A, regarding tobacco or food;
(B) any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other
animals, which contains ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully
purchased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter medication without prescription; or
(C) dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other similar substances including concentrates or extracts, which are
not otherwise regulated by law, which may contain naturally occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed in this
chapter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(g)(i) "Controlled substance analog" means a substance the chemical structure of which is substantially similar to the
chemical structure of a controlled substance listed in Schedules I and II of Section 58-37-4, or in Schedules I and II of the
federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II, P.L. 91-513 [FN 1]:
(A) which has a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to the
stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central nervous system of controlled substances in the schedules set
forth in Subsection (l)(f); or
(B) which, with respect to a particular individual, is represented or intended to have a stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic
effect on the central nervous system substantially similar to the stimulant depressant, or hallucinogenic effect on the central
nervous system of controlled substances in the schedules set forth in this Subsection (1).
(ii) "Controlled substance analog" does not include:
(A) a controlled substance currently scheduled in Schedules I through V of Section 58-37-4;
(B) a substance for which there is an approved new drug application;
(C) a substance with respect to which an exemption is in effect for investigational use by a particular person under Section
505 of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 366, to the extent the conduct with respect to the substance is permitted
by the exemption;
(D) any substance to the extent not intended for human consumption before an exemption takes effect with respect to the
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substance;
(E) any drug intended for lawful use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other
animals, which contains ephedrine, pseudoephedrine, norpseudoephedrine, or phenylpropanolamine if the drug is lawfully
purchased, sold, transferred, or furnished as an over-the-counter medication without prescription; or
(F) dietary supplements, vitamins, minerals, herbs, or other similar substances including concentrates or extracts, which are
not otherwise regulated by law, which may contain naturally occurring amounts of chemical or substances listed in this
chapter, or in rules adopted pursuant to Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(h) "Conviction" means a determination of guilt by verdict, whether jury or bench, or plea, whether guilty or no contest, for
any offense proscribed by Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d, or for any offense under the laws of the United States
and any other state which, if committed in this state, would be an offense under Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d.
(i) "Counterfeit substance" means:
(i) any substance or container or labeling of any substance that without authorization bears the trademark, trade name, or
other identifying mark, imprint, number, device, or any likeness of them, of a manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other
than the person or persons who in fact manufactured, distributed, or dispensed the substance which falsely purports to be a
controlled substance distributed by, any other manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser; or
(ii) any substance that is represented to be a controlled substance.
(j) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constructive, or attempted transfer of a controlled substance or a listed chemical,
whether or not an agency relationship exists.
(k) "Department" means the Department of Commerce.
(1) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means:
(i) a drug which contains any quantity of barbituric acid or any of the salts of barbituric acid;
(ii) a drug which contains any quantity of:
(A) amphetamine or any of its optical isomers;
(B) any salt of amphetamine or any salt of an optical isomer of amphetamine; or
(C) any substance which the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney General of the United States after
investigation has found and by regulation designated habit-forming because of its stimulant effect on the central nervous
system;
(iii) lysergic acid diethylamide; or
(iv) any drug which contains any quantity of a substance which the Secretary of Health and Human Services or the Attorney
General of the United States after investigation has found to have, and by regulation designated as having, a potential for
abuse because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the central nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect.
(m) "Dispense" means the delivery of a controlled substance by a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to the lawful order
or prescription of a practitioner, and includes distributing to, leaving with, giving away, or disposing of that substance as well
as the packaging, labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the substance for delivery.
(n) "Dispenser" means a pharmacist who dispenses a controlled substance.
(o) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by administering or dispensing a controlled substance or a listed chemical.
(p) "Distributor" means a person who distributes controlled substances.
(q) "Division" means the Division of Occupational and Professional Licensing created in Section 58-1-103.
(r) "Drug" means:
(i) articles recognized in the official United States Pharmacopoeia, Official Homeopathic Pharmacopoeia of the United
States, or Official National Formulary, or any supplement to any of them;
(ii) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure, mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in man or other animals;
(iii) articles, other than food, intended to affect the structure or function of man or other animals; and
(iv) articles intended for use as a component of any articles specified in Subsection (l)(r)(i), (ii), or (iii); but does not include
devices or their components, parts, or accessories.
(s) "Drug dependent person" means any individual who unlawfully and habitually uses any controlled substance to endanger
the public morals, health, safety, or welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of controlled substances as to have lost the
power of self-control with reference to his dependency.
(t) "Food" means:
(i) any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral, or animal origin other than a drug as specified in this chapter, and normally
ingested by human beings; and
(ii) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason of a physical, physiological, pathological, or other condition including but
not limited to the conditions of disease, convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, allergy, hypersensitivity to food, underweight,
and overweight; uses for supplying a particular dietary need which exist by reason of age including but not limited to the ages
of infancy and childbirth, and also uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unusual diet with any vitamin,
mineral, or other dietary property for use of a food. Any particular use of a food is a special dietary use regardless of the
nutritional purposes.
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(u) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which the Attorney General of the United States has found to be, and by
regulation designated as being, the principal compound used or produced primarily for use in the manufacture of a controlled
substance, or which is an immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be used in the manufacture of a controlled
substance, the control of which is necessary to prevent, curtail, or limit the manufacture of the controlled substance.
(v) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation, propagation, compounding, or processing of a controlled substance,
either directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of natural origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis
or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis.
(w) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or labels any container of any controlled substance,
except pharmacists who dispense or compound prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate consumer.
(x) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus cannabis and all parts of the genus, whether growing or not; the seeds of it;
the resin extracted from any part of the plant; and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of
the plant, its seeds, or resin. The term does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber produced from the stalks, oil or
cake made from the seeds of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the
mature stalks, except the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of
germination. Any synthetic equivalents of the substances contained in the plant cannabis sativa or any other species of the
genus cannabis which are chemically indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are also included.
(y) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency of the United States or any foreign country.
(z) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following, whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from substances of
vegetable origin, or independently by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction and chemical synthesis:
(i) opium, coca leaves, and opiates;
(ii) a compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of opium, coca leaves, or opiates;
(iii) opium poppy and poppy straw; or
(iv) a substance, and any compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, or preparation of the substance, which is chemically
identical with any of the substances referred to in Subsection (l)(z)(i), (ii), or (iii), except narcotic drug does not include
decocainized coca leaves or extracts of coca leaves which do not contain cocaine or ecgonine.
(aa) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an unconditional promise to pay a sum of money, which are
legally transferable to another party by endorsement or delivery.
(bb) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance having an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability similar to
morphine or being capable of conversion into a drug having addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability.
(cc) "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species papaver somniferum L., except the seeds of the plant.
(dd) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust, other institution or entity or one or more individuals.
(ee) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of the opium poppy, after mowing.
(ff) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging,
maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of
controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a
possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have individually possessed, used, or
controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly participated with one or more persons in the
use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is
found in a place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise dominion and
control over it.
(gg) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veterinarian, pharmacist, scientific investigator, pharmacy, hospital, or other
person licensed, registered, or otherwise permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with respect to, administer, or use
in teaching or chemical analysis a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in this state.
(hh) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription orally or in writing.
(ii) "Prescription" means an order issued by a licensed practitioner, in the course of that practitioner's professional practice,
for a controlled substance, other drug, or device which it dispenses or administers for use by a patient or an animal. The order
may be issued by word of mouth, written document, telephone, facsimile transmission, computer, or other electronic means
of communication as defined by rule.
(jj) "Production" means the manufacture, planting, cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance.
(kk) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or other evidences of debt or of property.
(11) "State" means the state of Utah.
(mm) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully possesses a controlled substance for his own use, for the use of a
member of his household, or for administration to an animal owned by him or a member of his household.
(2) If a term used in this chapter is not defined, the definition and terms of Title 76, Utah Criminal Code, shall apply.
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La^s 1971, c. 145, § 2; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 3; Laws 1979, c. 12, § 1; Laws 1981, c. 75, § 1; Laws 1982, c. 12, § 1; Laws
1987, c. 190, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 50, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 186, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 225, § 60; Laws 1991, c. 198, § 1; Laws
1992, c. 121, § 1; Laws 1994, c. 132, § 2; Laws 1996, c. 170, § 53, eff. July 1, 1996; Laws 1996, c. 294, § 1, eff. April 29,
1996; Laws 1997, c. 64, § 2, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 2003, c. 131, § 40, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 241, § 1, eff. May 3,
2004; Laws 2005, c. 283, § 2, eff. May 2, 2005.
[FN1]21U.S.C.A. §812.

CROSS REFERENCES
Dangerous weapons, possession by certain persons, see § 76-10-503.
Driving with controlled substance in the body, penalties and arrest without warrant, see § 41-6a-517.
Illegal Drug Stamp Tax Act, see § 59-19-101 et seq.
Implied consent to chemical tests for alcohol or drugs, see § 41-6a-520.
Optometrists, see § 58-16a-601.
Pharmacists, see § 58-17a-102.
Podiatrists, see § 58-5a-102.
Unlawful or unprofessional conduct, generally, see § 58-1-501.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Admissibility of evidence 6
Arrest 3
Consumption 8
Crime prevention 2
Defenses 5
Law governing 1
Manufacture 4
Peyote 7
Notes of Decisions Index
1. Law governing
Where specific conduct is controlled by the Imitation Controlled Substances Act, its provisions should control. U.C.A. 1953,
58-37-2 et seq., 58-37-19. State v. Hill, 1984, 688 P.2d 450. Controlled Substances «** 43
2. Crime prevention
Police officer's participation in drug transaction outside city jurisdiction was not as private citizen, but was in his official
capacity as undercover police officer assigned to investigate narcotics offenses, so that police officer acted outside scope of
his statutory authority when he conducted investigations outside city jurisdiction. U.C.A.1953, 77-9-3; U.C.A.1953, 77-13(5)(a)(i) (Repealed). State v, Fixel, 1987, 744 P.2d 1366. Criminal Law €»* 1222.1
3. Arrest
Arrest of defendant for unlawful possession of controlled substance was supported by probable cause, where defendant
emerged from bedroom in which plate was found with eight chips of heroin, along with paraphernalia to cut and inject
heroin, fresh hypodermic tracks were seen on defendant's arms, and other indicia of heroin intoxication were observed such
as defendant's nodding off during police raid. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4; U.C.A.1953, 58-37-2(27), 77-23-10(2). State v.
Lee, 1993, 863 P.2d 49. Arrest©** 63.4(15)
4. Manufacture
Conviction of possession with intent to produce or manufacture controlled substance could rest upon defendants' use of
cooker to remove nonhallucinogenic elements from raw marijuana plant thereby producing more concentrated and potent
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U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
Chapter 37. Utah Controlled Substances Act (Refs & Annos)
§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts—Penalties

(1) Prohibited acts A—Penalties:
(a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful for any person to knowingly and intentionally:
(i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
(ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance, or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a controlled or
counterfeit substance;
(iii) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance with intent to distribute; or
(iv) engage in a continuing criminal enterprise where:
(A) the person participates, directs, or engages in conduct which results in any violation of any provision of Title 58,
Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d that is a felony; and
(B) the violation is a part of a continuing series of two or more violations of Title 58, Chapters 37, 37a, 37b, 37c, or 37d on
separate occasions that are undertaken in concert with five or more persons with respect to whom the person occupies a
position of organizer, supervisor, or any other position of management.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a) with respect to:
(i) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, a controlled substance analog, or gammahydroxybutyric acid as listed in
Schedule III is guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or subsequent conviction is guilty of a first degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon a second or
subsequent conviction is guilty of a second degree felony; or
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction is
guilty of a third degree felony.
(c) Any person who has been convicted of a violation of Subsection (l)(a)(ii) or (iii) may be sentenced to imprisonment for
an indeterminate term as provided by law, but if the trier of fact finds a firearm as defined in Section 76-10-501 was used,
carried, or possessed on his person or in his immediate possession during the commission or in furtherance of the offense, the
court shall additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently.
(d) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (l)(a)(iv) is guilty of a first degree felony punishable by imprisonment for
an indeterminate term of not less than seven years and which may be for life. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not
be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(2) Prohibited acts B—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
(i) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled substance,
unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by this chapter;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat, aircraft, or other place
knowingly and intentionally to permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully possessing, using, or distributing controlled
substances in any of those locations; or
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess an altered or forged prescription or written order for a controlled
substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to:
(i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more, is guilty of a second degree felony;
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but less than 100 pounds, or a
controlled substance analog, is guilty of a third degree felony; or
WestlaiwNexT © 20i 1 Thomson Reurers No claim 10 original U S Government Works

1

§ 58-37-8. Prohibited acts—Penalties, U.C.A. 1953 § 58-37-8
(iii) marijuana, if the marijuana is not in the form of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and the amount is more
than one ounce but less than 16 ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Upon a person's conviction of a violation of this Subsection (2) subsequent to a conviction under Subsection (l)(a), that
person shall be sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided in this Subsection (2).
(d) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) with respect to all other controlled substances not included in Subsection
(2)(b)(i), (ii), or (iii), including less than one ounce of marijuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor. Upon a second
conviction the person is guilty of a class A misdemeanor, and upon a third or subsequent conviction the person is guilty of a
third degree felony.
(e) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(i) while inside the exterior boundaries of property occupied by any
correctional facility as defined in Section 64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement shall be sentenced to a
penalty one degree greater than provided in Subsection (2)(b), and if the conviction is with respect to controlled substances as
listed in:
(i) Subsection (2)(b), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and:
(A) the court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently;
and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) Subsection (2)(d), the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the
court shall additionally sentence the person convicted to a term of six months to run consecutively and not concurrently.
(f) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (2)(a)(ii) or (2)(a)(iii) is:
(i) on a first conviction, guilty of a class B misdemeanor;
(ii) on a second conviction, guilty of a class A misdemeanor; and
(iii) on a third or subsequent conviction, guilty of a third degree felony.
(g) A person is subject to the penalties under Subsection (4)(c) who, in an offense not amounting to a violation of Section 765-207:
(i) violates Subsection (2)(a)(i) by knowingly and intentionally having in his body any measurable amount of a controlled
substance; and
(ii) operates a motor vehicle as defined in Section 76-5-207 in a negligent manner, causing serious bodily injury as defined in
Section 76-1-601 or the death of another.
(3) Prohibited acts C—Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful for any person knowingly and intentionally:
(i) to use in the course of the manufacture or distribution of a controlled substance a license number which is fictitious,
revoked, suspended, or issued to another person or, for the purpose of obtaining a controlled substance, to assume the title of,
or represent himself to be, a manufacturer, wholesaler, apothecary, physician, dentist, veterinarian, or other authorized
person;
(ii) to acquire or obtain possession of, to procure or attempt to procure the administration of, to obtain a prescription for, to
prescribe or dispense to any person known to be attempting to acquire or obtain possession of, or to procure the
administration of any controlled substance by misrepresentation or failure by the person to disclose his receiving any
controlled substance from another source, fraud, forgery, deception, subterfuge, alteration of a prescription or written order
for a controlled substance, or the use of a false name or address;
(iii) to make any false or forged prescription or written order for a controlled substance, or to utter the same, or to alter any
prescription or written order issued or written under the terms of this chapter; or
(iv) to make, distribute, or possess any punch, die, plate, stone, or other thing designed to print, imprint, or reproduce the
trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark, imprint, or device of another or any likeness of any of the foregoing upon
any drug or container or labeling so as to render any drug a counterfeit controlled substance.
(b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (3)(a) is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) Prohibited acts D—Penalties:
(a) Notwithstanding other provisions of this section, a person not authorized under this chapter who commits any act declared
to be unlawful under this section, Title 58, Chapter 37a, Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act, or under Title 58, Chapter 37b,
Imitation Controlled Substances Act, is upon conviction subject to the penalties and classifications under this Subsection (4)
if the trier of fact finds the act is committed:
(i) in a public or private elementary or secondary school or on the grounds of any of those schools:
(ii) in a public or private vocational school or postsecondary institution or on the grounds of any of those schools or
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institutions;
(iii) in those portions of any building, park, stadium, or other structure or grounds which are, at the time of the act, being used
for an activity sponsored by or through a school or institution under Subsections (4)(a)(i) and (ii);
(iv) in or on the grounds of a preschool or child-care facility;
(v) in a public park, amusement park, arcade, or recreation center;
(vi) in or on the grounds of a house of worship as defined in Section 76-10-501;
(vii) in a shopping mall, sports facility, stadium, arena, theater, movie house, playhouse, or parking lot or structure adjacent
thereto;
(viii) in a public parking lot or structure;
(ix) within 1,000 feet of any structure, facility, or grounds included in Subsections (4)(a)(i) through (viii);
(x) in the immediate presence of a person younger than 18 years of age, regardless of where the act occurs; or
(xi) for the purpose of facilitating, arranging, or causing the transport, delivery, or distribution of a substance in violation of
this section to an inmate or on the grounds of any correctional facility as defined in Section 76-8-311.3.
(b) A person convicted under this Subsection (4) is guilty of a first degree felony and shall be imprisoned for a term of not
less than five years if the penalty that would otherwise have been established but for this subsection would have been a first
degree felony. Imposition or execution of the sentence may not be suspended, and the person is not eligible for probation.
(c) If the classification that would otherwise have been established would have been less than a first degree felony but for this
Subsection (4), a person convicted under Subsection (2)(g) or this Subsection (4) is guilty of one degree more than the
maximum penalty prescribed for that offense.
(d)(i) If the violation is of Subsection (4)(a)(xi):
(A) the person may be sentenced to imprisonment for an indeterminate term as provided by law, and the court shall
additionally sentence the person convicted for a term of one year to run consecutively and not concurrently; and
(B) the court may additionally sentence the person convicted for an indeterminate term not to exceed five years to run
consecutively and not concurrently; and
(ii) the penalties under this Subsection (4)(d) apply also to any person who, acting with the mental state required for the
commission of an offense, directly or indirectly solicits, requests, commands, coerces, encourages, or intentionally aids
another person to commit a violation of Subsection (4)(a)(xi).
(e) It is not a defense to a prosecution under this Subsection (4) that the actor mistakenly believed the individual to be 18
years of age or older at the time of the offense or was unaware of the individual's true age; nor that the actor mistakenly
believed that the location where the act occurred was not as described in Subsection (4)(a) or was unaware that the location
where the act occurred was as described in Subsection (4)(a).
(5) Any violation of this chapter for which no penalty is specified is a class B misdemeanor.
(6)(a) Any penalty imposed for violation of this section is in addition to, and not in lieu of, any civil or administrative penalty
or sanction authorized by law.
(b) Where violation of this chapter violates a federal law or the law of another state, conviction or acquittal under federal law
or the law of another state for the same act is a bar to prosecution in this state.
(7) In any prosecution for a violation of this chapter, evidence or proof which shows a person or persons produced,
manufactured, possessed, distributed, or dispensed a controlled substance or substances, is prima facie evidence that the
person or persons did so with knowledge of the character of the substance or substances.
(8) This section does not prohibit a veterinarian, in good faith and in the course of his professional practice only and not for
humans, from prescribing, dispensing, or administering controlled substances or from causing the substances to be
administered by an assistant or orderly under his direction and supervision.
(9) Civil or criminal liability may not be imposed under this section on:
(a) any person registered under the Controlled Substances Act who manufactures, distributes, or possesses an imitation
controlled substance for use as a placebo or investigational new drug by a registered practitioner in the ordinary course of
professional practice or research; or
(b) any law enforcement officer acting in the course and legitimate scope of his employment.
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(10) If any provision of this chapter, or the application of any provision to any person or circumstances, is held invalid, the
remainder of this chapter shall be given effect without the invalid provision or application.

Laws 1971, c. 145, § 8; Laws 1972, c. 22, § 1; Laws 1977, c. 29, § 6; Laws 1979, c. 12, § 5; Laws 1985, c. 146, § 1; Laws
1986, c. 196, § 1; Laws 1987, c. 92, § 100; Laws 1987, c. 190, § 3; Laws 1988, c. 95, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 50, § 2; Laws 1989,
c. 56, § 1; Laws 1989, c. 178, § l;Laws 1989, c. 187, § 2; Laws 1989, c. 201, § 1; Laws 1990, c. 161, § l;Laws 1990, c. 163,
§§ 2, 3; Laws 1991, c. 80, § 1; Laws 1991, c. 198, § 4; Laws 1991, c. 268, § 7; Laws 1995, c. 284, § 1, eff. May 1, 1995;
Laws 1996, c. 1, § 8, eff. Jan. 31, 1996; Laws 1997, c. 64, § 6, eff. May 5, 1997; Laws 1998, c. 139, § 1, eff. May 4, 1998;
Laws 1999, c. 12, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 1999, c. 303, § 1, eff. May 3, 1999; Laws 2003, c. 10, § 1, eff. May 5, 2003;
Laws 2003, c. 33, § 6, eff. May 5, 2003; Laws 2004, c. 36, § 1, eff. March 15, 2004; Laws 2005, c. 30, § 1, eff. May 2, 2005.

CROSS REFERENCES
Arrest of school employee, notice required, see § 53-10-211.
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102.
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq.
DUI, conviction defined, see § 41-6a-502.
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301.
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302.
Minors, suspension of driver's license for certain offenses, see § 78-3a-506.
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203.
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204.
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Controlled Substances 6 ^ 2 0 to 51.
Westlaw Key Number Searches: 96Hk20 to 96Hk51.
RESEARCH REFERENCES
ALR Library
118 A.L.R.Fed. 567, Permissibility Under Fourth Amendment of Detention of Motorist by Police. Following Lawful Stop for
Traffic Offense, to Investigate Matters Not Related to Offense.
27 A.L.R.5th 593, Validity, Construction, and Application of State Statutes Prohibiting Sale or Possession of Controlled
Substances Within Specified Distance of Schools.
34 A.L.R.5th 125, Criminality of Act of Directing To, or Recommending, Source from Which Illicit Drugs May be
Purchased.
4 A.L.R.5th 1, Minimum Quantity of Drug Required to Support Claim that Defendant is Guilty of Criminal "Possession" of
Drug Under State Law.
57 A.L.R. 3rd 1319, Conviction of Possession of Illicit Drugs Found in Automobile of Which Defendant was Not Sole
Occupant.
Treatises and Practice Aids
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U.C A. 1953 § 58-37a-5
West's Utah Code Annotated Currentness
Title 58. Occupations and Professions
Chapter 37A. Utah Drug Paraphernalia Act (Refs & Annos)
§ 58-37a-5. Unlawful acts

(1) It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate,
grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain,
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this chapter.
Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
(2) It is unlawful for any person to deliver, possess with intent to deliver, or manufacture with intent to deliver, any drug
paraphernalia, knowing that the drug paraphernalia will be used to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale, or
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body in violation of this act. [FNl] Any person who violates this
subsection is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(3) Any person 18 years of age or over who delivers drug paraphernalia to a person under 18 years of age who is three years
or more younger than the person making the delivery is guilty of a third degree felony.
(4) It is unlawful for any person to place in this state in any newspaper, magazine, handbill, or other publication any
advertisement, knowing that the purpose of the advertisement is to promote the sale of drug paraphernalia. Any person who
violates this subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.

Laws 1981, c. 76, §5.
[FNl] Laws 1981, c. 76, that enacted this chapter.
[Note: next amended May 5, 2008]

CROSS REFERENCES
Attempt, elements and classification, see §§ 76-4-101 and 76-4-102.
Conspiracy and solicitation, elements and penalties, see § 76-4-201 et seq.
Fines upon conviction of misdemeanor or felony, see § 76-3-301.
Inchoate offenses, limitations on sentencing, see §§ 76-4-301 and 76-4-302.
Mandatory revocation, denial, suspension, or disqualification of license, see § 53-3-220.
Minors, suspension of driver's license for certain offenses, see § 78-3a-506.
Penalties for felonies, see § 76-3-203.
Penalties for misdemeanors, see § 76-3-204.
Prohibited act and penalties, Controlled Substances Act, see § 58-37-8.
Right to trial by jury, see Const. Art. 1, § 10.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Controlled Substances 0 ^ 4 2 .
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Addendum B

JURY INSTRUCTION NO.
DIRECT AKD CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
Two classes of evidence axe recognized and admitted in courts of justice, upon either or both
of which, juries lawfully may base their findings whether favorable to the State or to the Defendant,
provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilty the evidence, whether of one land or the other
or a combination of both, most carry the convincing quality required by law.
One type of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes no
distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to their
effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may carry and
accepts each as reasonable method of proof,
Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in question consists of the testimony of
every witness who7 with any of his own physical senses perceived such conduct or any part thereof,
and which testimony describes or relates what thus was perceived, All other evidence admitted in
the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct and, insofar, as it shows any act, statement or
other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove by reasonable inference the innocence
or guilt of the defendant, it may be considered by you in arriving at a verdict.
You are not permitted to find the defendant guilty of the charges against him based totally on
circumstantial evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory that
the defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other rational conclusion.
Each fact which is essential to complete a set of circumstances necessary to establish the defendant's
guilt must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt

Addendum C

INSTRUCTION NO.

7

Before you can convict the Defendant of POSSESSION OF DRUG
PARAPHERNALIA, a Class B Misdemeanor, as charged in the Information,
you must find, from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the
following elements of that crime:
1.

That on or about October 20, 2005, at Sevier County,

State of Utah, the Defendant possessed with intent to use drug
paraphernalia.
2.

That the purpose of possessing the drug paraphernalia

was to inject, ingest, inhale, or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body.

If, after weighing all the available evidence, you are
satisfied tha t all of the above elements have been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt, then you should find the Defendant guilty.

If,

however, you are not satisfied that each element has been proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant not guilty.

Addendum D

5th District

UOUH

Sevier County
One,

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SEVIER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,
V E R D I C T
vs.
JAMES CHRISTIANSEN CRABB,
DOB: 04/04/67
Defendant,

Case No. 051600320FS
Judge Paul D. Lyman

WE, THE JURY, FIND THE DEFENDANT, JAMES CHRISTIANSEN CRABB:

WITH REGARD TO COUNT 1:
GUILTY of POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE,
A Third Degree Felony; or
NOT GUILTY.

WITH REGARD TO COUNT 2.
GUILTY of POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, A
Class B Misdemeanor; or
NOT GUILTY.
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